A study on the competitive harms and legal regulation of Self-Preferencing behaviors on digital platforms
数字平台自我优待行为的竞争损害与法律规制路径研究

摘要

本文系统探讨了数字平台自我优待行为的竞争损害及其法律规制路径。研究首先界定了自我优待行为的构成要件与典型模式，包括搜索结果操纵型、数据利用型和交易条件强制型，并结合谷歌、亚马逊及阿里巴巴的案例进行阐释。在影响评价方面，对比分析了欧盟侧重于市场结构与综合损害评估、美国侧重于效率与消费者福利测试的两种规制逻辑差异。最后，从明确法律界定、强化平台透明度、构建全链条监管体系及平衡创新与公平竞争等维度，提出完善我国相关法律规制的具体建议，以期为数字市场健康有序发展提供理论参考。

Abstract

This article systematically explores the competitive harms of self-preferencing behaviors by digital platforms and their legal regulatory pathways. The study first defines the constitutive elements and typical models of self-preferencing behaviors, including search result manipulation, data exploitation, and coercive transaction terms, and illustrates these with case studies involving Google, Amazon, and Alibaba. In terms of impact assessment, the research compares and analyzes the differences between the EU's regulatory logic, which focuses on market structure and comprehensive harm assessment, and the U.S. approach, which emphasizes efficiency and consumer welfare tests. Finally, the article proposes specific recommendations for improving China's relevant legal regulations, including clarifying legal definitions, enhancing platform transparency, constructing a comprehensive regulatory system, and balancing innovation with fair competition. The aim is to provide theoretical reference for the healthy and orderly development of the digital market.