Legal regulation of digital platform self-preferencing: A perspective on its impact on brand fair competition
数字平台自我优待行为的法律规制研究——以对品牌公平竞争的影响为视角

摘要

数字平台自我优待行为是指平台在运营中优先推广自有产品或服务，同时降低第三方竞争者可见度的商业策略。随着谷歌、亚马逊等超级平台在全球范围内频遭反垄断调查，该行为对品牌公平竞争的损害已成为数字经济时代反垄断的核心议题。本文结合经济学模型与法学理论，分析自我优待行为通过流量剥夺、成本转嫁与创新抑制三重机制扭曲品牌竞争生态的路径，指出其损害具有场景依赖性（受佣金率、市场依赖度等因素调节）。在规制路径上，建议我国构建“合理原则下的个案分析框架”，结合平台市场势力、品牌依赖程度及竞争损害综合判定违法性，并基于《反垄断法》修订契机细化“守门人平台”义务，建立数据隔离与算法透明制度，以平衡平台效率与品牌公平竞争。

Abstract

Digital platform self-preferencing refers to the business strategy whereby platforms prioritize the promotion of their own products or services while reducing the visibility of third-party competitors. As super-platforms such as Google and Amazon have frequently faced antitrust investigations worldwide, the harm caused by such behavior to brand fair competition has become a core issue in antitrust regulation in the digital economy era. Drawing on economic models and legal theory, this paper analyzes how self-preferencing distorts the brand competition ecosystem through three mechanisms: traffic deprivation, cost shifting, and innovation suppression. It further points out that the extent of harm is context-dependent, influenced by factors such as commission rates and market dependency. Regarding regulatory approaches, it is recommended that China establish a "case-by-case analysis framework under the rule of reason," assessing illegality based on the platform's market power, the degree of brand dependency, and the extent of competitive harm. Leveraging the revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law, obligations for "gatekeeper platforms" should be specified, and systems for data separation and algorithm transparency should be established to balance platform efficiency with brand fair competition.