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Open Access Article

Modern Social Science Research. 2022; 2: (1) ; 35-38 ; DOI: 10.12208/j.ssr.20220007.

The enforceability of the VAM agreement between the investor and the target company
论投资方与目标公司对赌协议的可履行性

作者: 王金菊 *

浙江工商大学法学院 杭州浙江

*通讯作者: 王金菊,单位:浙江工商大学法学院 杭州浙江;

发布时间: 2022-04-14 总浏览量: 527

摘要

在履行不能判断主体模式上,《九民纪要》坚持法官的绝对地位,但公司的商业决策往往更有效率,司法商业判断是更合理的判断主体模式。在判断标准上,《九民纪要》坚持资本维持原则,但清偿能力标准既能保护债权人利益,又不妨碍公司经营与发展,是更合理的准线。判断减资程序和利润分配程序是否构成对赌协议履行不能的障碍时,应当平衡投资方、目标公司、公司股东以及公司债权人之间的利益。

关键词: 对赌协议;履行不能;股权回购

Abstract

In the mode of performance can not be judged, The Minutes of the National Courts' Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference insists on the absolute status of judges, but the company's business decision-making is often more efficient, judicial business judgment is a more reasonable mode of judgment subject. In judging standards, The Minutes of the National Courts' Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference adhere to the principle of capital maintenance, but the solvency standard can protect the interests of creditors, and not hinder the company's operation and development, is a more reasonable line. When judging whether the capital reduction procedure and the profit distribution procedure constitute an obstacle to the performance of the VAM agreement, the interests of the investor, the target company, the shareholders of the company and the creditors of the company should be balanced.

Key words: Valuation adjustment mechanism agreements; Impossibility of performance; Share repurchase.

参考文献 References

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引用本文

王金菊, 论投资方与目标公司对赌协议的可履行性[J]. 现代社会科学研究, 2022; 2: (1) : 35-38.